A Decisão do TEDH (1)

 (Continuação daqui)

1. A Decisão do TEDH

Foi publicado hoje  o Acórdão do TEDH  sobre o caso que me opõe ao Estado português.

(Nota: O comentário televisivo que deu origem ao processo é este: cf. aqui; O momento da minha condenação pelo Tribunal da Relação do Porto ficou também gravado neste blogue: cf. aqui).

Antes de reproduzir a decisão, uma pequena homenagem. O acaso é a vontade de Deus e quis o acaso que a decisão do TEDH fosse anunciada no Dia do Pai. Eu gostaria de dedicar ao meu Pai, Manuel Arroja, a batalha que travei pela justiça e pela razão, ao longo dos últimos anos, e que hoje teve o seu momento mais alto. Ele era um homem obcecado com a razão, mesmo quando não a tinha. Neste aspecto, tal Pai, tal filho. Onde quer que se encontre, ele deve estar hoje muito orgulhoso de mim.

Agora, a decisão do TEDH:

  Conclusion

91.  In view of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds that the balancing exercise performed by the domestic courts was not undertaken in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law.

92.  The Court therefore considers that the interference with the applicant’s right to freedom of expression was not supported by relevant and sufficient reasons (see, mutatis mutandis, Freitas Rangel, cited above, § 62, and contrast Pais Pires de Lima v. Portugal, no. 70465/12, § 65, 12 February 2019). In particular, the Court finds that the domestic courts gave disproportionate weight to the rights to reputation and honour of the law firm C. and P.R., in contrast to the applicant’s right to freedom of expression. The domestic courts therefore exceeded the margin of appreciation afforded to them regarding limitations on debates of public interest, and there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between, on the one hand, the restriction of the applicant’s right to freedom of expression and, on the other hand, the legitimate aim pursued (see, mutatis mutandis, Bozhkov v. Bulgaria, no. 3316/04, § 55, 19 April 2011; Pais Pires de Lima, cited above, §§ 66-67; and SIC – Sociedade Independente de Comunicação v. Portugal, no. 29856/13, § 69, 27 July 2021; see also, by contrast, Stângu and Scutelnicu v. Romania, no. 53899/00, § 56, 31 January 2006).

93.  Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention

(...)

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,

1. Declares the application admissible;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 10 of the Convention;

3. Holds

(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention:

(i) EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;

(ii) EUR 5,000 (five thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;

(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.

Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 March 2024, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.

Fonte: cf. aqui

NOTA: O TEDH atribui-me uma indemnização de 10 mil euros por danos morais e mais 5 mil euros por despesas incorridas junto deste Tribunal Europeu.

Para recuperar os montantes que paguei em indemnizações ao Paulo Rangel (cerca de 12 mil euros) e à Cuatrecasas (cerca de 6 mil euros), multas ao Estado (7 mil euros) e custas judiciais (só no Tribunal Constitucional foram 5 mil euros), o TEDH diz-me para pedir a reabertura do processo-crime nos tribunais portugueses (o que eu faria sempre para fins de serem relevados os crimes do registo criminal) e pedir aí o reembolso de todas essas despesas. 

É o que resulta dos parágrafos 97 e 104:

97.  Regarding pecuniary damage, the Court observes that under Article 449 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 31 above), an applicant may seek the reopening of criminal proceedings in respect of which the Court has found a violation of the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis and in respect of the possibility of reopening civil proceedings, SIC – Sociedade Independente de Comunicação, cited above, § 75). The Court therefore considers that the most appropriate form of redress would be the reopening of the criminal proceedings at the applicant’s request. Since the domestic law allows that solution, the Court is of the opinion that the applicant’s claim under this head must be rejected.

104.  As regards the costs and expenses incurred in the domestic proceedings, taking into account the fact that the applicant will be able to have those costs or at least part of them reimbursed should the criminal proceedings be reopened at his request under Article 449 (g) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (see paragraph 31 above), the Court considers that there is no call to award him any sum under this head (compare SIC – Sociedade Independente de Comunicação, cited above, § 79).

(Continua acolá)