+ evolutionary ethics

But what about the naturalistic fallacy -- the prohibition against deriving ethical "oughts" from any empirical "is"? Even if our ethical impulses make evolutionary (adaptive) sense, so what? Here it may be fair to accuse Wright of letting us down. As noted earlier, Wright could not discern any basis for ethics in Darwinism or evolutionary psychology. "Can morality have no meaning for the thinking person in a post-Darwinian world? This is a deep and murky question that (the reader may be relieved to hear) will not be rigorously addressed in this book" (p.329). Nevertheless, a few pages later Wright presents an argument for utilitarianism as a basis for morality. He claims that the "happiness" criterion is "unscathed" by the naturalistic fallacy because happiness is in fact a value that "we all share" (pp. 334-335). Furthermore, happiness has a non-zero-sum property; everyone's happiness can go up if everyone treats everyone else nicely (synergy). In other words, we can derive an ethical system from a shared and/or interdependent set of social values. Ethics are not ends in themselves but instrumental means; if we all prefer happiness, then an ethical system can promote our common objective.

Why, in the name of Darwin, can't the same logic be applied to the biological problem of survival and reproduction? Forget happiness. Let's focus on evolutionary ethics. If we all (or almost all) seek to survive and reproduce, and if our survival and reproductive success -- not to mention the longer-term reproductive success of our progeny (call it "posterity") -- is largely dependent, ultimately, upon the "collective survival enterprise" -- the tacit raison d'etre of a complex human society -- why can't we use our shared Darwinian "interests" as the basis for an evolutionary ethics? If we take the long view, and the large view, any ethical system that is conducive to "the survival and reproductive success of the greatest number" would, on balance, also be likely to be conducive to our own survival and reproductive interests. That, I submit, is a logical (and sturdy) foundation for an evolutionary ethics, although I am also well aware that there are some pitfalls to be avoided.

Peter A. Corning