"Without delving too deeply into the murky waters of
epistemology, I would deny, as an Aristotelian and neo-Thomist, any
such alleged "laws of logical structure" that the human mind necessarily
imposes on the chaotic structure of reality. Instead, I would call all such
laws "laws of reality," which the mind apprehends from investiga ting
and collating the facts of the real world. My view is that the fundamental
axiom and subsidiary axioms are derived from the experience of reality
and are therefore in the broadest sense empirical.
I would agree with the
Aristotelian realist view that its doctrine is radically empirical, far more
so than the post-Humean empiricism which is dominant in modern
philosophy.
If, in the broad sense, the axioms of praxeology are radically
empirical, they are far from the post-Humean empiricism that pervades
the modern methodology of social science.
In addition to the foregoing
considerations, (1) they are so broadly based in common human
experience that once enunciated they become self-evident and hence do
not meet the fashionable criterion of "falsifiability"; (2) they rest,
particularly the action axiom, on universal inner experience, as well as
on external experience, that is, the evidence is reflective rather than
purely physical; and (3) they are therefore a priori to the complex
historical events to which modern empiricism confines the concept of
"experience."
Praxeology:The Methodology of Austrian Economics
By Murray N. Rothbard
[From The Logic of Action One: Method, Money, and the Austrian School by Murray
N. Rothbard (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 1997), pp. 58-77 (pagination retained
from this edition); also The Foundations of Modern Austrian Economics, Edwin Dolan,
ed. (Kansas City: Sheed and Ward, 1976) , pp. 19-39.]
3 comentários:
Então, agora vamos para o método científico e eu é que me ando a dispersar?
Quer voltar, ou não, à questão do direito natural e àquilo que o Rothbard entendia por ele, de preferência demonstrando a coincidência, que vc. sempre alega, entre o jusnaturalismo católico e a defesa da "lei" (não exactamente do "direito", que é coisa doutrinariamente distinta) natural de Rothbard?
"as an Aristotelian and neo-Thomist"
Tenho de citar, ver aqui:
"The Thomist tradition, on the contrary, was precisely the opposite: vindicating the independence of philosophy from theology and proclaiming the ability of man's reason to understand and arrive at the laws, physical and ethical, of the natural order. If belief in a systematic order of natural laws open to discovery by man's reason is per se anti-religious, then anti-religious also were St. Thomas and the later Scholastics, as well as the devout Protestant jurist Hugo Grotius. The statement that there is an order of natural law, in short, leaves open the problem of whether or not God has created that order; and the assertion of the viability of man's reason to discover the natural order leaves open the question of whether or not that reason was given to man by God. The assertion of an order of natural laws discoverable by reason is, by itself, neither pro- nor anti-religious.[4]
Because this position is startling to most people today let us investigate this Thomistic position a little further. The statement of absolute independence of natural law from the question of the existence of God was implicit rather than flatly asserted in St. Thomas himself; but like so many implications of Thomism, it was brought forth by Suarez and the other brilliant Spanish Scholastics of the late sixteenth century."
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